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Graev: Conditional
Facade Easement
By Wendy C. Gerzog
The Tax Court decided Graev v. Commissioner1
under fully stipulated facts. In 1999, the taxpayers,
residents of New York City, purchased property
listed in the National Register of Historic Places for
$4.3 million, subject to a mortgage.
Pre-2004 case law is replete with disallowed
facade easements either for overvaluation or unen-
forceability issues.2 Under Notice 2004-41,3 the gov-
ernment advised that it would be scrutinizing the
substance of transactions involving real property
purchases, charitable organizations, and conserva-
tion easements. One example mentioned in the
notice described a charitable organization that
bought property, placed a conservation easement
on the property, and sold the property at a substan-
tially reduced price to a buyer who made a cash
‘‘charitable donation’’ to the organization to reim-
burse the charity for its financial loss. In that
instance, the notice stated that the government may
treat the cash donation as part of the buyer’s
purchase price instead of as a charitable gift.
Later, the National Architectural Trust (NAT), a
charitable organization with a mission ‘‘to preserve
historic architecture in metropolitan areas across the
United States,’’4 approached Mr. Graev to make a
facade easement gift. Having qualms about the
latest government ruling, Graev, an attorney, sought
the advice of his accountant. Graev then e-mailed
NAT with his concerns after the accountants urged
caution and Graev asked for NAT’s ‘‘thoughts es-
pecially as it relates to the side letter.’’5
The side letter was NAT’s letter to Graev explain-
ing that it was NAT’s standard policy to refund the
applicable portion of Graev’s donation if he
couldn’t get the promised favorable charitable de-
duction. Specifically, the letter promised ‘‘to join
with Graev to immediately remove the façade ease-
ment from the property’s title.’’6 Referencing the
assurance made by NAT both to Graev and to his
neighbor, Graev executed the facade easement
agreement on September 20, 2004.
A firm appraised the value of the facade ease-
ment at $990,000. At or near the end of 2004, Graev
executed a deed that granted a facade easement to
NAT and the deed was recorded on February 17,
2005. The conservation deed provided that the
easement grant would facilitate preservation, in
perpetuity, of the historic structure and of the public
open space, but it also stated that the provisions of
the deed were not intended to limit the grantee’s
right ‘‘to abandon some or all of its rights hereun-
der.’’7 The mortgagee joined in the easement agree-
ment and agreed to subordinate its rights to the
enforcement of the conservation easement; how-
ever, the mortgagee declared to have claims, supe-
rior to the grantee, to all insurance or condemnation
proceeds.
In 2004 Graev made a total of $99,000 in cash
contributions to NAT, as requested by the trust to
subsidize NAT’s operating and future monitoring
and administrative expenses. In 2005 NAT sent
Graev a written acknowledgement of his easement
and cash donations, together with the applicable tax
forms to submit with his return. Also in 2005, NAT
sent two letters to Graev: the first, apprising him of
upcoming reforms, including penalties and fines,
applicable to taxpayers, promoters, and appraisers
1140 T.C. No. 17 (2013).
2Id., slip op. at 6-7, 8-9, n.5.
32004-28 IRB 31.
4Graev, at 5.
5Id. at 8. The side letter is also referred to as NAT’s comfort
letter.
6Id. at 11.
7Id. at 13.
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involved in ‘‘significantly overvalued’’ facade ease-
ment donations; and the second, informing him that
the refund offer ‘‘may adversely affect the deduct-
ibility of the cash contribution as a charitable gift.’’8
Graev did not ask NAT to remove the refund
feature of his donation.
After those NAT letters, the Graevs filed their
income tax returns for 2004 and 2005, taking deduc-
tions for both the easement and the cash contribu-
tion to NAT.9 In its September 22, 2008, notice of
deficiency, the government disallowed the taxpay-
ers’ charitable deductions because the donations
were made ‘‘subject to subsequent events.’’ The
taxpayers contended that the side letter agreement
was unenforceable under New York law and a
nullity under federal tax law.
The court reviewed the facts to determine
whether the gifts were conditional donations or
whether the condition was allowed under the regu-
lations10 because it was ‘‘so remote as to be negli-
gible.’’ Moreover, as the court stated, ‘‘Section 170
and the corresponding regulations provide instruc-
tion and limitations that, at least in part, ensure that
the donor will be able to deduct only what the
donee organization actually receives.’’11 The court
reviewed the background of the applicable regula-
tion’s language (‘‘so remote as to be negligible’’)
and the identical language in an older estate tax
regulation.12
The Supreme Court interpreted the estate tax
regulation in Sternberger.13 Concerned that the do-
nation must match what the charity actually re-
ceived, the court stated that deductible gifts must be
unconditional ‘‘unless the possibility that the char-
ity will not take is ‘negligible’ or ‘highly improb-
able.’’’14 Applying that standard, the Tax Court held
that the deduction was only allowable if the possi-
bility that NAT would lose its easement and cash
was so remote that it was a negligible risk.
The legislative history of charitable split interests
accords with that emphasis. Section 170(f)(3) was
enacted in 1969 and denied a deduction for most
partial interests in property, including conservation
easements, but also allowed a donation of an open
space easement in gross that was donated to a
charity in perpetuity. It wasn’t until the 1976 Tax
Reform Act that Congress amended section
170(f)(3) to create a deduction for a conservation
easement. That provision was later revised and
expanded in 1980 to include subsection (h), which
defines a qualified conservation contribution. The
regulations define the perpetuities requirement as
ensuring that the potential for the divestment of the
easement be so remote as to be negligible.
The court held that at the time of the easement
and cash donations, the potential for the IRS to
disallow those deductions and for NAT to remove
the easement and return the cash to Graev was not
so remote as to be negligible. Although Graev
argued that case law at the time of the donation
allowed for a donation of between 10 and 15
percent of the value of the property, and that he had
deducted a value constituting 11 percent of the
property’s appraised value, the court emphasized
that at that date, the potential for IRS disallowance
was not negligible and that valuation was a sepa-
rate issue. Indeed, the court stated that Graev acted
(for example, filing returns with the deductions and
failing to remove the refund feature) in response
both to the IRS notice indicating additional scrutiny
applicable to overvalued facade easements and to
NAT’s second letter warning of the government’s
disallowance of a deduction for facade easement
donations coupled with refund provisions.
Responding to the Graevs’ argument that the one
example provided in Notice 2004-41 did not apply
to their specific transaction, the court found that the
notice advised more generally that donations relat-
ing to conservation easements would involve
greater scrutiny, and that Graev was well aware of
this intensified IRS examination, as indicated in his
correspondence with his accountants. NAT agreed
to return Graev’s contributions if the government
disallowed deductions for them. Thus the court
held that the risk of the government’s disallowing
the deduction was ‘‘well above ‘negligible.’’’15 Ac-
cording to the court, Graev required NAT’s letter
with the refund feature before making his contribu-
tion. Also, NAT understood that an IRS disallow-
ance was more than a remote possibility and that
was why NAT would routinely issue comfort letters
to potential donors.
The court explained that Graev misinterpreted
the court’s ruling in O’Brien v. Commissioner,16 in
which the taxpayers created a charitable remainder
trust in 1964, appointing themselves trustees with
broad management powers. The issue in the case
8Id. at 15.
9Their 2004 return was filed on October 10, 2005, wherein
they deducted the full $99,000 cash contribution and $544,449
for the easement deduction, as limited by section 170(b)(1)(C).
They deducted the remaining $445,551 on their 2005 return. Id.
at 16-17.
10Reg. section 1.170A-1(e), -7(a)(3), and -14(g)(3).
11Id. at 19.
12Reg. section 20.2055-2(b).
13Commissioner v. Estate of Sternberger, 348 U.S. 187, 194
(1955).
14Id. at 22.
15Id. at 33.
1646 T.C. 583 (1966), acq. 1968-1 C.B. 2.
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was whether the donors had retained control suffi-
cient to cause the gift to be incomplete. The return
of their contributions was solely in the govern-
ment’s act of disallowance regardless of the correct-
ness of its action, placing ‘‘the contingency ‘within
the control of the Commissioner.’’’17 In O’Brien, the
court held that the taxpayers had the right to first
litigate their position so that the return contingency
was not applicable unless the taxpayers lost. The
court held that O’Brien did not even address the
issue of a tax contingency under the section 170
regulations and ‘‘did not hold that a tax-treatment
contingency can never be a subsequent event that
will defeat a contribution and a deduction.’’18
The court also rejected Graev’s argument that
there was no possibility that NAT would return the
property. The court analyzed New York’s conserva-
tion easement law and held that while NAT’s letter
alone would not satisfy the state’s extinguishment
requirements, the recorded deed sufficiently re-
served NAT’s power to abandon the easement in
compliance with New York law. Therefore, the court
found that this possibility was ‘‘more than negli-
gible.’’19
Likewise, the court was unmoved by Graev’s
contention that the doctrine of merger extinguished
NAT’s refund letter. The court cited, as an exception
to that principle, a clear intention by the parties to
have a particular provision of a contract survive the
deed. Graev required NAT’s letter before making
his donation and thus the letter clearly qualified as
an inducement for him to make the contribution.
Even when NAT offered to rescind the letter, Graev
declined that offer. Therefore, the court found that
the parties intended the letter to survive the deed
and that the doctrine of merger did not apply.
Finally, Graev argued that the letter was a nullity
under Commissioner v. Procter.20 In Procter, a trust
provided that a noncharitable gift would revert to
the donor if a court later determined that the
transfer would be subject to gift tax. The court held
that the trust provision was void as contrary to
public policy because it (1) discourages the govern-
ment’s tax collection by nullifying the audit of
returns; (2) renders the court’s decision moot by
canceling the gift the court has adjudged; and (3)
disturbs a final judgment.
The taxpayer in Procter had asserted that under
the terms of the trust, the gift was not to become
effective if a court found the transfer to be subject to
the gift tax. However, the circuit court held that
such a clause in the trust could not prevent the
imposition of the gift tax because the clause would
discourage the government’s tax collection and the
gift tax should not be so easily avoided. Further-
more, the court refused to allow that kind of ‘‘tri-
fling with the judicial process.’’
The Tax Court in Graev held that Procter was
inapplicable because recognizing that the refund
feature in NAT’s letter would not prevent Graev
from being taxed on his contribution would not
undo a judicial decision, would not discourage tax
collection, would not render the case moot, and
would not undo the judgment in the case. The court
concluded that at the time of the donation, the
possibility that the IRS would disallow Graev’s
deduction and that NAT would thereby return both
the easement and cash contributions to Graev was
not ‘‘so remote as to be negligible’’ in contravention
of the regulations. Therefore, the court disallowed
both donation deductions.
Analysis and Conclusion
It is ironic that the taxpayers in Graev cited to
Procter to sustain their position. If anything, the
facts in Graev reflect the very behavior so repugnant
to the Procter court.
When a charitable donation is conditional on
receiving a tax deduction, it is difficult to accept that
the primary goal of the taxpayer is to make a gift to
a charity. In United States v. American Bar Endow-
ment,21 donative intent was central to allowing a
charitable deduction. That is, while the charitable
deduction is often an incentive for making or in-
creasing a charitable gift, no one may contract with
a charity to make a donation dependent on getting
a tax benefit. If all charitable gifts were conditional
on receiving a tax deduction, that limitation would
place a heavy burden on charities. They would not
know if they were receiving funds and could not
rely on using those ‘‘donations’’ until several years
in the future. Yet, of course, most donors actually
want the charity to be able to apply their funds to
the charity’s exempt purpose.
It is also difficult to value a conditional gift at its
fair market value, because a transfer of property
with a refund feature must surely be heavily dis-
counted. Alternatively, if the gift is viewed as a
17Graev, op. at 37, citing O’Brien, at 591 (quoting Surface
Combustion Corp. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 631, 655 (1947), aff’d, 181
F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1950)).
18Id. at 38.
19Id. at 45.
20142 F.2d 824 (4th Cir. 1944).
21477 U.S. 105, 117-118 (1986) (‘‘The sine qua non of a
charitable contribution is a transfer of money or property
without adequate consideration. The taxpayer, therefore, must
at a minimum demonstrate that he purposely contributed
money or property in excess of the value of any benefit he
received in return.’’ Id.).
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precondition, the completed gift and deduction
should not occur until the statute of limitations has
run.
As a general policy matter, extending that notion
would add extreme complexity to tax administra-
tion. What if, for example, payments of expenses
were refundable on the condition of a deduction
disallowance? What possible positive policy goal
would that serve?
This case and others suggest reasons to eliminate
the facade easement deduction. The reduction in
value because of the easement is often more hypo-
thetical than real. Adding a refund ‘‘guarantee’’
based on the tax benefits to the donor makes the
transfer more a commercial transaction than a chari-
table gift.
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